The Political and Social Strategy of the Catholic Church in Chile by Codner, Joleen
Lehigh University
Lehigh Preserve
Chile in transition Perspectives on Business and Economics
1-1-1999
The Political and Social Strategy of the Catholic
Church in Chile
Joleen Codner
Lehigh University
Follow this and additional works at: http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v17
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Perspectives on Business and Economics at Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chile in transition by an authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact preserve@lehigh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Codner, Joleen, "The Political and Social Strategy of the Catholic Church in Chile" (1999). Chile in transition. Paper 7.
http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v17/7
THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
STRATEGY OF THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH IN CHILE 
Joleen Codner 
Introduction 
The Catholic Church in Chile is known for 
its progressive role during the military dicta-
torship from 1973 to 1980. Through the Vicaria 
de Solidaridad the Church functioned as a "pro-
tective umbrella," playing a key role in battling 
human rights violations, aiding the victims of 
the economic policies, and housing various 
organizations. As discontent with the military 
regime grew, the Church took an active role in 
moving toward democracy. After the election 
of Patricio Alywin in 1989, the Church faced 
new challenges; political parties had reemerged, 
decreasing the need for a politically active 
Church. In Chile today, the Catholic Church is 
adapting to democracy while it searches for its 
new place in the Chilean social structure. What 
will this "new" role be? The answer to this 
question rests, in part, on the Church's histor-
1The author wishes to thank Professor Hannah Stewart-
Gambino for her helpful comments and assistance. 
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ical definition of its role in Chilean society and, 
in part, on the Church elites' perceptions of 
current needs in Chile. 
This paper is divided into five sections. 
The first section provides a background of the 
Church's Social Doctrine and political strate-
gies. The second section discusses the Social 
Doctrine and the Universal Church's political 
strategies in Chile prior to the military dicta-
torship, and the next section examines the 
Church's choice to oppose the military regime. 
The fourth section deals with the reemergence 
of the political parties and the Church's medi-
ating role in the transition to democracy. The 
last section analyzes the Church's role during 
the return to democracy and the present. 
The Universal Church and Catholic 
Social Doctrine 
The Universal Catholic Church is a com-
plex hierarchical institution, ranging from the 
pope and the Vatican, to the national Churches, 
to the local parishes. The Universal Church's 
core mission is religious: teaching, maintaining, 
and interpreting the central dogmas of 
Catholicism and regulating the moral code. In 
addition to its religious mission to save souls, 
however, the Church also interprets Catholic 
values in the world through its Social Doctrine 
by applying Catholic dogma to social and politi-
cal issues. Unlike the core religious mission, the 
Catholic Church's Social Doctrine has changed 
over time to respond to historical circumstances. 
Catholic Social Doctrine is interpreted by the 
pope while bishops and priests are responsible 
for teaching the values of the Social Doctrine. 
Historically, the Church's Social Doctrine 
focused almost exclusively on administering to 
the poor. During the First Vatican Council 
(1869-1870), the Church opposed clergy par-
ticipation in politics and focused on defending 
the Church's authority as an institution. By the 
close of the 19th century, however, Pope Leo 
XIII began addressing worker injustices result-
ing from industrialization in his encyclical, 
Rerum Novarum (1891). This document applies 
to life in the workplace and proposes a set of 
principles governing workers' rights. The 
Church always considers it her task to call 
attention to the dignity and rights of those who 
work and to condemn situations in which that 
dignity and those rights are violated. (Royal, 
p. 26) Rerum Novarum recognizes that work-
ers have a right to organize in Catholic associ-
ations and unions which could act as mediat-
ing structures between capital and labor. It also 
considers workers' right to strike, calling on 
Catholic employers to provide a living and just 
wage. (Royal, p. 20) Pope Leo XIII condemned 
the misuse of men as instruments for another's 
gain. The rise of capitalism emphasizes mate-
rialist attitudes among men and reduces them 
to merely economic players. The abuses of cap-
italism are blamed for the miserable conditions 
of the working class. 
Forty years later in 1931, Pope Pius XI wrote 
Quadragesimo Anno as a response to a world full 
of conflict, when social movements such as com-
munism and socialism threatened the basic prin-
ciples of the Church. The Pope called for a recon-
struction of society through the reform of 
institutions such as Marxism and liberalism, and 
the reintegration of moral life by those who had 
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strayed from their religious backgrounds. 
(Darring) Like Rerum Novarum, Quadragesimo 
Anno also addressed workers' rights issues and 
asserted that Catholic social teachings should be 
practiced by both capital and labor. 
These two encyclicals laid the foundation 
for the 20th century Catholic Social Doctrine 
and the Universal Church's critique of classical 
liberalism, Marxism, and secularism. (Stewart-
Gambino, The Church and Politics ... , p. 4) 
Throughout the 20th century, the Church has 
opposed liberalism because of its excessive 
emphasis on individualism and its association 
with anticlericalism. The Church also opposed 
Marxism because of its doctrine of violent con-
flict between the classes. Finally, Catholic 
Social Doctrine warned of the dangers of secu-
larism, which relegates religious belief to the 
merely "personal" realm of an individual's life. 
Even though Catholic Social Doctrine is 
universal, national Churches and even individ-
ual bishops determine how to best tailor the 
Social Doctrine to the temporal realities in each 
country or in each diocese. The mandate to 
oppose secularism or Marxism in many coun-
tries led national Church hierarchies to work 
in alliance with Catholic political parties, which 
were usually conservative. The pattern of work-
ing in close alliance with conservative, pro-
clerical parties was particularly pronounced in 
Latin America, including Chile. However, with 
the publication of Quadragesimo Anno, the 
Universal Church changed strategies, urging 
national Churches to rise "above politics" in 
order to disassociate the Church from the (often 
falling) political fortunes of any particular party. 
Catholic Social Doctrine in Chile 
Prior to the Pinochet Regime 
In a relatively short period of time, Chile 
experimented with a wide range of approaches 
to solve some of its chronic economic and polit-
ical problems. The predominantly Catholic cul-
tural heritage of the country, coupled with pas-
toral innovations in the Church, has made 
Catholicism an important factor in shaping 
some of these experiments. (Smith, The Church 
and Politics ... , p. 11) 
In 1925 under President Arturo Alessandri, 
a new constitution was drafted that officially sep-
arated the Church and state. Although some 
Chilean clergy continued to identify strongly 
with the conservative party, others (most 
notably Archbishop of Santiago Crescente 
Errazuriz) strictly forbade clergy from partici-
pating in politics or instructing Catholics to vote 
for the conservative party. Although the Chilean 
Catholic Church had outwardly declared that it 
was nonpartisan, this in no way meant that it 
was nonpolitical. With no specific political party 
association, it nevertheless looked out for its 
interests. For example, the Catholic Church had 
always opposed divorce and abortion and count-
ed on allies within the political parties to vote 
according to Church views. 
In order to "rise above politics" yet main-
tain political influence, the Church adopted a 
strategy called Catholic Action (1931) that was 
encouraged by the Vatican. The purpose was to 
disseminate religious principles through cate-
chism training, the strengthening of Catholic 
family morality primarily through young 
women's groups, and the formation of an 
awareness of Catholic civic duties. (Stewart-
Gambino, The Church and Politics ... , p. 33) 
More than most other Latin American Church 
hierarchies, Chile followed this model. Catholic 
Action was designed for national Churches to 
devise programs to develop leadership in the 
workplaces, political parties, and social organi-
zations. Through these types of organizations, 
the Church hoped to influence the full range of 
social and political institutions rather than rely-
ing solely on the Conservative Party, as had 
been done previously. The Church also main-
tained an extensive range of nationally funded 
Catholic schools through which it instilled 
Catholic values in the next generation. 
By the time of the Second Vatican Council 
(1962-1965), the Universal Catholic Church 
under Pope John Paul XXIII's leadership wor-
ried that Catholicism had simply become irrel-
evant in the modern world. Vatican II led to 
reforms in the Universal Church, such as trans-
lating church ceremonies from Latin to the ver-
nacular and modernizing the delivery of the 
sacraments. In Chile, Vatican II spawned sev-
eral very progressive movements, such as the 
worker-priest movement, the rapid prolifera-
tion of socially progressive grass-roots-based 
Christian communities (CEBs), and an open 
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sympathy among many of the members of the 
hierarchy for the centrist Christian Democratic 
Party. (Stewart-Gambino, "Retreat to the 
Sacristy ... ," p. 149) By the end of the 1960s, 
many clerics had moved farther left with some 
in the Church supporting the socialist presi-
dential candidate, Salvador Allende, who won 
the presidential election in 1970. 
The Catholic Church during the 
Pinochet Regime 
By 1973, the Chilean political system was 
deeply polarized and violent civil unrest was 
rampant. The economic policies of the Allende 
government caused the economic power of the 
business class to weaken while leaving their 
political power intact so that they could mobi-
lize through their business associations and 
right-wing political parties. (Martinez, p. 45) 
As a result of the deep economic crisis, riots 
occurred daily in the streets, schools, and fac-
tories. The Catholic bishops under the leader-
ship of Archbishop Silva Henriquez called for 
the military to step in to restore order. The 
Church, however, did not anticipate the level of 
violence of the coup that began on September 
11, 1973, under General Pinochet. When the 
coup began, military tanks patrolled the streets, 
the presidential building was bombed, and a 
new period in Chilean history began. 
After the coup, the military dictatorship 
dissolved the congress. The military aimed to 
depoliticize the country by ridding Chile of left-
ist activists and banning political parties, trade 
unions, and nearly every other form of civil 
organization. Along with this, the military 
installed a new economic system using the 
"Chicago Boys" to shape the economic model. 
Thousands of people suspected of being 
enemies of the military "disappeared," while the 
military used systematic human rights viola-
tions, from torture to murder, to maintain 
social control. The only organization safe from 
overt military repression during this time was 
the Catholic Church. Although initially the 
hierarchy was publicly silent about the mili-
tary's violence, preferring to work behind the 
scenes to save lives, by 1975 the Church began 
to take an active role. Church leaders began 
criticizing the dictatorship for its human rights 
abuses and, later, its economic strategy; how-
ever, most bishops were careful to avoid direct 
confrontations with the military. 
Responding to the many outcries against 
human rights violations by the military, the 
Church hierarchy published Evangelio y Paz 
(Gospel and Peace) in 1975. This encyclical 
letter identified some of the most basic human 
rights that must be respected as a precondi-
tion for peace in any society, such as the right 
to life and bodily integrity. ("Evangelio y Paz," 
p. 465) In this document, however, the bish-
ops were careful to express their appreciation 
to the military for taking over and combating 
the rise of Marxism. 
During this time, the Church preferred to 
deal with the military's human rights violations 
through private meetings with military leaders, 
fearing that public confrontations would threat-
en its working position with the government. 
Evangelio y Paz accepted the military's legiti-
macy, although the encyclical letter tried to 
hint that human rights violations were evident. 
This had no effect on the military's policies. 
In 1977, Chilean bishops publishedNuestra 
Convivencia Nacional (Our Life as a Nation), 
which stepped up the Church's criticism of the 
military. In this letter, the bishops inquired into 
the whereabouts of the "disappeared" people, 
noted the military's human rights violations, and 
criticized the economic policies. This pastoral 
letter clearly showed a change in attitude since 
Evangelio y Paz. The bishops had become bold-
er and, from this time on, openly voiced their 
dissatisfaction with the regime. 
Although the bishops were reluctant to 
publiCly criticize the military in 1973, that year 
Archbishop Silva Henriquez helped found the 
ecumenical Committee of Cooperation for 
Peace (COPACHI) in order to aid those perse-
cuted by the military. COPACHI later extend-
ed help to the poor hurt by the regime's eco-
nomic policies. In the countryside it helped set 
up cooperatives for small farmers, and in 
Santiago it supported health clinics in working-
class neighborhoods where more than 75,000 
patients were treated during the first two years 
of military rule. (Smith, The Church and 
Politics ... , p. 313) On the other hand, COPACHI 
had only about 300 members and thus was lim-
ited in the aid it could provide. In spite of its 
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limitations, by 197 4 the government began to 
publicly criticize COPACHI, and many of its 
members were arrested. 
Due to great pressure from the govern-
ment, Archbishop Silva Henriquez dissolved 
COPACHI in 1975 and created in its place the 
Vicaria de Solidaridad. The Vicaria had the same 
goals as COPACHI, although there were some 
organizational differences; for one thing, the 
Vicaria was founded in the Catholic Church. 
During the dictatorship, the Vicaria became a 
safe haven; organizations such as the 
Association of the Families of the Disappeared, 
workers' unions, and peasant organizations were 
able to meet in the Vicaria. The Vicaria also 
served as the largest legal service for victims and 
their families of political imprisonment, arrest, 
and torture during the regime. Furthermore, 
the Vicaria ran programs aiding those convict-
ed and accused, fought for the protection of per-
sonal freedoms, and provided support for those 
exiled from the country. Documented informa-
tion about the abuses of the military regime, 
especially the human rights violations, were 
compiled, analyzed, and investigated through 
the Vicaria. 
The military's economic policies created 
widespread economic hardship. While hunger 
and unemployment increased, government 
spending, particularly in the social welfare pro-
grams, was slashed. At diocesan levels, many 
smaller Church community organizations, 
non-government organizations (NGOs), and 
popular economic organizations (PEOs) were 
formed to provide support for the middle and 
lower classes. In one 1986 study of over 1,200 
popular economic organizations in the 
Santiago metropolitan area, approximately 84 
percent of the organizations that did not have 
meeting locations met in sites provided by the 
Catholic Church. (Stewart-Gambino, "Retreat 
to the Sacristy ... ," p. 147) 
As the Church actively voiced criticism of 
the political and economic policies, Church ties 
with the lower and working classes became 
stronger. At the same time, the Church's con-
nections with the upper class and right wing 
parties became strained. Many wealthy 
Chileans who thought that the Church's social 
policies were too closely linked to the lower 
classes and to the political left felt excluded. 
Some upper class Chileans and right wing party 
members publicly criticized the Church for its 
social and political activities. 
The Reemergence of Political Parties 
Spurred by faith in the self-regulation of 
the market, the military government removed 
all restrictions on foreign borrowing by banks 
at the end of 1979 and allowed private individ-
uals or companies to receive loans in foreign 
currency as well. (Martinez, p. 58) During this 
time, foreign debt increased greatly, and many 
"paper companies" were formed. The Chilean 
economic boom, which began in 1975 when the 
military regime applied free market principles 
to the economy, came to a quick end in 1982, 
leading to skyrocketing unemployment and an 
escalation of opposition to the military. Then 
on May 11, 1983, the Confederation of Copper 
Workers called for a national protest against the 
regime and its economic policies. The unex-
pected success of the protest led to planned 
monthly demonstrations with thousands tak-
ing to the streets to demand a return to democ-
racy and Pinochet's resignation. In response to 
the people's protests, the regime answered by 
arresting and torturing many people. 
Once the demonstrations began, political 
parties became revitalized by the possibility of 
governmental changes. During the military 
regime, the political parties had been main-
tained through Church organizations; but 
when they began to reemerge, the Church was 
able to step back from the political light. With 
less attention focused on politics during the 
early 1980s, the Chilean Catholic Church 
underwent some internal changes. Under pres-
sures from the hierarchy, the Church decided 
to concentrate less on its activist position in 
social and political issues and more on the reli-
gious mission of the Church; but it continued 
many of its policies against human rights vio-
lations and aided those suffering from the eco-
nomic policies. 
A significant internal change occurred in 
1983, when Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez 
retired and was replaced by Archbishop Juan 
Francisco Fresno as the new archbishop of 
Santiago. The two religious leaders had differ-
ing opinions on the proper role of the Church. 
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Archbishop Fresno emphasized the spiritual 
mission, believing that the Church should not 
be associated with political issues. Fresno also 
argued that the hierarchy's apparent endorse-
ment of the opposition and its political goals in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s reinforced the 
divisions in Chilean society, alienated many 
believers from the saving grace of the Church, 
and contributed to the loss of the Church's 
moral authority. (Stewart-Gambino, "Redefining 
the Changes ... ," p. 28) Although Fresno want-
ed to pull the Church out of politics, the bish-
ops could not ignore the poor and the regime's 
constant violation of human rights. Moreover, 
Pinochet authorized attacks on the Church 
itself. For example, in March 1983 Pinochet 
expelled three Irish priests from the country for 
participating in hunger marches and activities 
involving the defense of human rights. 
According to a declaration issued in July 1983 
by priests working in eastern Santiago, beatings 
and arrests of chapel custodians were part of a 
continuing "campaign of harassment against 
the Catholic Church." (Kinzer, p. 3) 
In an attempt to mediate between the mil-
itary and the growing strength of the protesters, 
Fresno initiated meetings between government 
officials and opposition leaders. Unfortunately, 
these meetings were unsuccessful, for neither 
side was willing to compromise. The net results 
of these failed talks were greater polarization and 
distrust between opposition and alliances, 
greater unease on the right and hence a greater 
tendency to continue support for Pinochet, and 
embarrassment on the part of the Church. 
(Stewart -Gambino, "Redefining the Changes ... ," 
p. 30) Church-state relations quickly deterio-
rated. Criticisms of the Church escalated after 
this, with not only priests but also Church build-
ings coming under attack. Newspapers were not 
allowed to publish anything that the Catholic 
Church had to say about the state-of-siege mea-
sures that were being enforced. 
In an attempt to quiet the criticisms of the 
Church, Archbishop Fresno launched the 
National Accord for the Transition to Full 
Democracy in 1985. The National Accord was 
created to encourage dialogue between political 
parties. The Accord arose out of a number of 
meetings in which representatives from various 
parties discussed the peaceful transition to a 
democratic government. Although the National 
Accord was eventually rejected by the military 
government, an important step had been made 
toward initiating dialogue between the opposi-
tion parties, thus uniting various forces against 
the regime. Although Fresno did not want a 
direct role in politics, by acting as a mediating 
influence between opposition parties he repre-
sented the Church's pro-democratic preferences. 
Pope John Paul II's visit to Chile in 1987 
also provided hope for a peaceful transition to 
democracy. During his visit, the Pope met with 
opposition representatives, which served to 
unite these forces and to show the regime that 
they were worth recognition. The Pope's main 
message for Chileans was that the transition to 
democracy could be accomplished through dia-
logue, reconciliation, nonviolence, and for-
giveness. He also indicated that the Vatican 
supported the transition to democracy and the 
Chilean Church's role in facilitating the dia-
logue between the military and political parties. 
Pope John Paul II also stressed the Church's 
position as a mediator in the transition, rather 
than as a political actor. 
After the Pope's visit to Chile, bishops 
encouraged people in their local communities 
to register as voters for the forthcoming 
plebiscite in 1988. The plebiscite simply 
involved casting a "yes" or "no" ballot for con-
tinued rule by Pinochet. As the plebiscite 
neared, opposition parties realized that protest-
ing no longer worked to push the military back 
to the barracks. Since the opposition forces saw 
the plebiscite as their only chance to challenge 
the Pinochet regime, they focused all of their 
efforts towards winning. On October 5, 1988, 
the plebiscite shocked General Pinochet and his 
supporters; 55 percent voted against continu-
ing the regime. In 1989, Christian Democrat 
Patricio Alywin became the president of Chile. 
The Church's Role during the Return 
to Democracy 
After sixteen years of military rule, the 
Chilean military was not ready for a sharp tran-
sition to a completely democratic government. 
The main obstacle to democracy was the 1980 
constitution, which did not allow full democ-
ratization to occur. In particular, the 1980 con-
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stitution included the following provisions: (1) 
that Pinochet remain head of the Army until 
1998, (2) that Pinochet stay as a senator for life, 
(3) that Pinochet be given the power to desig-
nate nine senators, ( 4) that 1/10 of the revenues 
from copper sales went to the armed forces, (5) 
that no changes be made to the economic poli-
cies instated by the military government, and 
(6) that a blanket amnesty be given to the mil-
itary for human rights violations that occurred 
before 1979. 
The stipulations of the 1980 constitution 
have held Chile back from accomplishing a 
complete transition to democracy. An example 
of the limitations of the 1980 constitution that 
Pinochet and his advisors wrote (to guarantee 
the military a role in government and a dispro-
portionate presence of the right wing parties in 
the legislature) can be seen in the senate, where 
many of the current senators held positions 
during the military regime. Pinochet did exer-
cise his power to assign nine of the forty-seven 
senators, which ensured pro-military support 
for Pinochet. Even today, military leaders 
refuse to give up their governmental power. 
Mter Alywin became president, very little 
changed in the country's economic strategy. 
Chile continued to focus on free trade and 
export-oriented growth, while inequality of 
income increased and the living conditions of 
the poor stayed the same or even worsened. In 
1996, the wealthiest 20 percent of Chilean house-
holds received over one-half of total income 
while the bottom three quintiles had less than 
25 percent of the total. (Duquette, p. 313) These 
figures demonstrate how the growing inequali-
ty of income greatly contributes to the problem 
of the lagging living standards of the poor. 
Although the country has not fully com-
pleted the transition to democracy during the 
1990s, the Church has completely retreated 
from its previous politically active role. 
Resuming its position above politics, the 
Church no longer takes a political position, and 
Church leaders interact with a range of politi-
cal leaders. Many clergy members are willing 
to settle with the current state of the govern-
ment, rather than returning to the previous 
state of military control. 
The Church's recession from the political 
scene was partially due to Cardinal Fresno's 
replacement by Bishop Carlos Oviedo (1989), a 
church conservative. Oviedo preached that the 
Church welcomes all people, independent of 
their political associations. Since Oviedo 
became the archbishop during the time of rede-
mocratization after the military regime, he was 
faced with determining the Chilean Catholic 
Church 's position in this new society. 
Following Pope John Paul II's message for a 
successful transition to democracy, Archbishop 
Oviedo stressed that reconciliation and for-
giveness were vital. 
Consistent with its new position, the 
Church's "protective umbrella," the Vicaria de 
Solidaridad, closed. Monsignor Sergio Valech, 
·the Vicaria's last head, commented on the clos-
ing by saying that "the Church believes it is now 
the duty of civilian society to safeguard the 
basic principles of human rights it once lost." 
(Crawford, p. 5) The closing of the Vicaria abol-
ished the central organizational structure that 
had coordinated support for an annual average 
of 1,600 organizations during the dictatorship 
in which an estimated 60,000 people partici-
pated per year. (Stewart-Gambino, "Retreat to 
the Sacristy ... ," p. 142) 
Even though the Vicaria closed, promi-
nent national organizations such as the 
Association of the Families of the Disappeared 
continued to function. Throughout the 1990s, 
many mothers and wives came forward through 
the Association, demanding to know the truth 
about what happened to their loved ones and 
insisting that the killers be brought to trial. 
The Church had gathered information through 
the Vicaria about the human rights violations 
which was later submitted to the Commission 
on Truth and Reconciliation. The Commission 
had been appointed to clarify "the truth about 
the gravest violations of human rights ... and 
to contribute to the reconciliation of all 
Chileans." (Ross, p. 10) The Commission, cre-
ated in 1991, presented a six-volume report to 
President Alywin about the violations. In it the 
Commission identified more than 3,500 cases 
of murder or disappearances at the hands of the 
military since 1973 and detailed the circum-
stances surrounding their cases. (Ross, p. 10) 
The government's policy of truth and rec-
onciliation was meant to provide justice to the 
families of victims by simply clarifying the sit-
67 
uation of the detained and disappeared. In the 
matter of reparations, the Commission sug-
gested symbolic reparations such as the con-
struction of a public monument in remem-
brance of the victims and a symbol of national 
reconciliation. The Commission on Truth and 
Reconciliation took a step toward justice by pro-
viding the truth, but not punishment for the 
perpetrators of crimes. 
Following the release of the report of the 
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, the 
government called on the families of victims to 
find forgiveness for the acts committed. A 
spokesman for the Alywin government said that 
once the report became public, the government 
would consider its duty accomplished. (Ross, p. 
10) Many Chileans, including some bishops, 
were enraged by this, however, and continued 
to demand justice through criminal proceedings 
for the treacherous acts that had been commit-
ted. The dismissal of military officers was not 
even remotely possible, however, because of the 
1980 constitution, which granted a blanket 
amnesty to the military for any human rights 
violations that occurred before 1979. 
As Archbishop Oviedo continued to define 
the Church's position within Chile 's new 
democracy, the Church began to reinforce its 
influence as the country's moral authority. 
While the Church's political strategy is rather 
clear, its civil role is still being debated. With 
its focus moving away from what happened dur-
ing the Pinochet regime, many Church orga-
nizations, including human rights organiza-
tions that developed during the dictatorship, 
have disappeared. Instead, the Chilean Catholic 
Church is now turning its attention to issues of 
personal morality and education. For example, 
whereas fraudulent marriage annulments are 
prevalent and divorce is illegal, the government 
frequently proposes bills to legalize divorce and 
then eventually rejects them. While the polls 
show that 70 percent of Chileans support the 
bills to legalize divorce, there are still many 
politicians with ties to the Catholic Church who 
continue to oppose changing the civil marriage 
code. (Faiola, p. A12) Other issues, ranging 
from abortion and sex education to television, 
are highly controlled and influenced by the 
Church. For example, due to pressures from 
the Church, in 1997 two television channels 
refused to transmit the health ministry's edu-
cational publicity against AIDS. ("Chile. Public 
Health ... ," p. 42) 
Because of inadequate state investment in 
education, the Chilean government is highly 
dependent on the Catholic schools. Just over 
one half of Chile's three million school children 
attend privately-owned schools. ("Chile. Public 
Health ... ," p. 42) In many of the wealthy neigh-
borhoods, Catholic schools are highly elitist and 
only accept students from "properly constitut-
ed" families. Through this selective process, 
the Catholic Church continues to educate 
future leaders with Catholic values. 
Among Church progressives, the proper 
role of the Church in civil society is not easily 
defined. Some progressives believe that the 
Church has an institutional responsibility to 
strengthen civil society and emphasize commu-
nity involvement through grassroots organiza-
tions as a means of helping the poor and main-
taining an influence in civil society. They believe 
that the Church cannot simply recede from soci-
ety and concentrate solely on its religious mis-
sion, but that it must be available to aid in the 
country's complete transition to democracy 
without interfering in the state's activities. As 
Pope John Paul II said in a homily on June 2, 
1997: "As long as there is injustice in the world, 
no matter how small, we must return to [social 
questions]. Otherwise the Church would not be 
faithful to the mission entrusted to her by Christ 
-the mission of justice." (Nickoloff, p. 24) 
The Future of the Chilean Catholic 
Church 
Although Chile's transition to democracy 
began in 1990, the country is still in a transitional 
state. While the Frei government elected in 1995 
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has proposed many judicial reforms, the 1980 
constitution still stands as an obstacle to com-
plete democracy. Today in its transitional state, 
Chile is in the process of developing a relation-
ship between the democratic state and its civil 
institutions. Successful democratic consolida-
tion, therefore, involves actors in civil society that 
play a role in linking people to democratic insti-
tutions and procedures. (Stewart-Gambino, 
"Retreat to the Sacristy ... ," p. 139) 
Even if many people have moved beyond 
the incidents that occurred during the dicta-
torship, certain events cause these memories 
to keep resurfacing. Graves are continually 
being discovered with bodies of "disappeared" 
people. Debates over reconciliation, justice, and 
impunity have been prompted by the detain-
ment of Pinochet in England in October 1998. 
Most recently, the Spaniards want to prosecute 
Pinochet for human rights violations against 
Spaniards who lived in Chile in the 1970s. 
Reminders from the past keep many Chileans 
from accepting what happened in the past. 
In the years ahead, the Church will be 
faced with new challenges arising from Chile's 
return to democracy. Between continuing 
issues of education, changing personal morali-
ty, and the increasing popularity of 
Protestantism, the Church may struggle to 
maintain its tight influence in civil society. The 
proper role of the Church will most likely result 
in a mixed model. In this model the Church will 
probably reassert its role as a moral guide to civil 
society from a self-imposed position outside or 
"above" politics. At the same time the Church 
will also probably maintain a strong influence 
in civil society through grassroots organizations 
and linkages that are more atomized and depen-
dent on individual priests and bishops. (Stewart-
Gambino, "Retreat to the Sacristy ... ," p. 152) 
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